‘Russian drone’ over military facility near Milan turned out to be GSM signal booster
What initially appeared to be a serious security incident involving a suspected Russian military drone over a sensitive site in northern Italy has turned out to be a striking example of false positives in drone detection. After months of investigation, Italian prosecutors concluded that no drone ever flew over the area. The repeated alerts were caused by a household GSM signal booster, combined with limitations in the anti-drone system used at the site.
Multiple alerts over sensitive locations
The incident took place near Lake Maggiore, close to the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the European Commission in Ispra, in the province of Varese. The area is also home to a Leonardo facility in Vergiate, where military helicopters are developed and tested. Given the strategic nature of these locations, any suspected drone activity is treated with extreme caution.
Between late March and late May, the JRC’s security system generated a total of 22 alerts, indicating the presence of an unmanned aircraft. According to the system’s classification, the detected object was identified as a Zala 421, a drone model manufactured and exclusively used in Russia. The Zala Aero Group, which produces the drone, is subject to European sanctions due to its support of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.
Criminal investigation and specialist involvement
The apparent detection of a Russian-made drone triggered a criminal investigation by the Milan public prosecutor’s office. Authorities looked into possible political or military espionage, terrorist association and threats to transport security. The situation was further complicated by the sighting of a black Cadillac near the research centre on one of the alert dates. Telecom data showed that the vehicle’s owner had contact with multiple Russian phone numbers.
Italy’s Carabinieri special operations unit (ROS) was brought in, along with a Rome-based company accredited by the Ministry of Defence for counter-UAS systems. Using radio direction-finding equipment and spectrum analysers, investigators searched for radiofrequency emissions consistent with drone operations.
A mundane source of interference
The investigation eventually led to a far less dramatic explanation. No drone was found, and no hostile activity could be confirmed. Instead, the source of the interference was traced to a residential property in Ispra. A family living there had installed a GSM signal booster, purchased online, to improve poor mobile phone reception inside their home.
The sporadic operation of this device generated radio interference that, when combined with other factors, repeatedly triggered the drone detection system. The black Cadillac also proved to be unrelated to any intelligence activity. Its owner was a local entrepreneur who happened to be in contact with Russian tourists, some of whom own holiday homes in the area.
Limitations of the anti-drone system
The JRC uses the HD5-R Anti-drone System. The system is supplied by German company Dedrone GmbH, with hardware manufactured by China-based Lizheng Technology and software developed by Latvian firm Raw-Tech. It works by monitoring radio frequencies within a five-kilometre radius and comparing detected signals with a database of known drone models and their signatures.
According to the software provider, the system is designed for temporary, portable use and requires regular reboots within defined time intervals. Continuous operation, as was the case at the JRC, can result in inaccurate signal decoding and misclassification of detected emissions.
Based on these findings, the Milan prosecutor has requested that the case be formally closed. The incident is expected to prompt changes in how counter-UAS systems are configured and operated at the Ispra research centre, and serves as a cautionary example of how easily false alarms can arise in complex RF environments.
(source: Corriere Della Serra)
